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Fair
Share
How
much value is lost with dual-class control structure?
By Brian
F. Smith, professor of finance, Wilfrid Laurier university; Ben
Amoako-Adu, professor of finance, Wilfrid Laurier university; and
Madhu Kalimipalli,associate professor of finance, Wilfrid Laurier
university.
Under
a dual-class share structure, a small group of shareholder-managers
can control a disproportionate amount of votes relative to their
equity investment. The relative lack of equity interest suggests
that there is weak alignment of interests of managers and outside
shareholders. This lack of alignment of interests increases the
risk that the controlling group of shareholder-managers will expropriate
private benefits from the corporation. This in turn increases the
need to monitor management by outside shareholders. The costs of
the monitoring are referred to as agency costs. In this way, management
voting leverage reduces corporate value.
Under the dual-class structure, there are two groups of outside
or minority shareholders. One group comprises those who hold a non-controlling
interest in the superior voting shares and the second comprises
those who hold restricted shares. Thus, under the dual-class structure,
shareholder agency costs, which reflect shareholder disagreement
and monitoring costs, will arise among the three groups of shareholders.
It can be argued that the more stakeholder groups a company has,
the larger are the agency problems and costs.
All is not negative with dual-class companies. The significant equity
investment in dollar terms that most controlling shareholder-managers
have in such companies may partially offset the negative influence
of management voting leverage. Such shareholders will often want
to protect their wealth by making sure the company is well managed
so that the wealth is preserved for descendants.
Previous research from other countries has found that dual-class
structure has either a negative or neutral impact on value. See
Lins (2003), Nenova (2003) and Gompers et al. (2004). In this study,
we examine the impact of management voting leverage on corporate
value in Canada and distinguish this impact from that of concentrated
control using a single class without a pyramid.
To test the hypothesis that management voting leverage reduces corporate
value, a regression is run with the dependent variable, the Q ratio,
and the main explanatory variable, management voting leverage, as
well as several control variables. The management voting leverage
is the proportion of equity over the proportion of votes held by
management. Where a company holds less than 100% of a subsidiary,
a pyramid structure exists and the management voting leverage is
adjusted accordingly. When the pyramid and dual-class structures
are combined, the result is a very high management voting leverage.
We define management as managers and noninstitutional shareholders
who directly or indirectly hold more than 10% of the votes of a
company. The bigger the management voting leverage, the bigger the
difference between voting rights and cash flow rights of management,
and hence the larger the agency problems. Based on corporate governance
theory and other empirical studies, we control for size, financial
leverage, institutional voting block, percentage of outside directors,
and type of industry. The variables used in the regression analysis
are defined as follows:
We
are able to gather complete data on 53 dual-class companies, 78
companies that were closely controlled single-class companies (single
shareholder has greater than 20% of votes) and 171 widely held companies.
On average, the dual-class firms have management with 66.1% of votes
but only 23.9% of equity. The mean (median) management voting leverage
for these companies is 6.33 (3.89). In four of these cases, a pyramid
structure is used to increase the management voting leverage. The
78 closely held single-class companies have shareholder-managers
with 46.3% of the votes on average. Thirteen of these single-class
companies use a pyramid structure. In these cases, the average (median)
management voting leverage is 5.88 (2.97). This means that the presence
of dual-class shares in Canada, and to a lesser extent the use of
pyramidal structures, creates an overall divergence between managerial
equity ownership and control rights.

Table 1 shows the results of the second stage of a two stage least
squares analysis of the relationship between corporate value and
voting leverage. Q-ratios are higher for technology companies (reflecting
growth opportunities) and lower for highly levered companies (reflecting
expected financial distress costs). Institutional votes weakly reduce
Q-ratios. Most notably, management voting leverage is found to have
a negative and significant effect on Q-ratios at the 1% level under
both specifications of the second-stage regression. The finding
suggests that if the management voting leverage increases by 1,
the marketto- book value should decrease by 0.26. Thus, dual-class
companies in Canada, on average, sell at a discount of 1.39 times
book value to their single-class counterparts (that did not use
pyramid structure) and single-class companies employing pyramid
structure sell at a discount of 1.27 times book value. The close
ownership and dual-class dummy variables by themselves or multiplied
with voting leverage are not significant. The findings indicate
that it is not close ownership per se that reduces value but the
management voting leverage that comes with dual-class shares and
corporate pyramids that leads to lower value.
References
Amoako-Adu, B., B. Smith, M. Kalimipalli, 2007, “Concentrated
Control and Corporate Value: A Comparative Analysis of Single and
Dual Class Structures,” Working Paper, Wilfrid Laurier University.
Gompers, Paul, Joy Ishii and Andrew Metrick, 2004, “Incentives
vs Control: Analysis of US Dual-Class Companies,” NBER Working
Paper Series.
Lins, Karl V., 2003, “Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging
Markets”. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
38, 159-184.
Nenova, Tatiana, 2003, “The value of corporate voting rights
and control: a cross-country analysis.” Journal of Financial
Economics, 68, 325-351.
To
see a pdf version of this article, click
here.
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