|
Quantitative
trading
The moving average is considered to be an effective tool to reveal
trends. It ostensibly removes noise and smoothes underlying data
by averaging a chosen number of observations. It is employed in
various market forecasting models and trading strategies which exploit
well-documented low-order serial correlation and nonlinearity of
return series. Empirical evidence from a number of developed and
emerging equity markets indicates that moving average models can
predict reversals in price and yield statistically and economically
significant excess returns over a buy-and-hold strategy, and that
this cannot as yet be attributed to measurement errors arising from
the use of non-synchronous trading data or the omission of dividend
yields.1 Surprisingly, genetic
algorithms that simultaneously search for optimal trading strategies
typically produce models similar to moving averages.2
This study evaluates the performance of ten double crossover moving
average strategies with and without a trading filter band on the
Toronto Stock Exchange S&P/TSX Composite Index.3While
such a study is of obvious relevance to individual investors, it
does have value for institutional investors who, regardless of whether
they hold broad market-based investments, either benchmark against
a market index or allocate capital to individual investments of
varying correlation with the market.
The strategy is simple. A long position is held when the short-period
average price is greater than the long period average price, and
a short position is held when the opposite is true. A filter band
is a predefined fixed percentage around the long moving average
that the short moving average must pass before the investment position
is changed. This presumably filters out weak signals. These moving
average strategies can be summarized by MA (p, q, r) model, where
p is the length of the short period, q is the length of the long
period, and r is the size of the filter band. So, for example, MA
(5, 150, 0.01) uses five days to calculate the short moving average,
150 days for the long, and imposes a filter band of 1% above and
below the long moving average.
To avoid selection biases, this study uses the same parameters
as in the seminal study on the topic by Brock, Lakonishok and LeBaron
(1992).4 Ito (2003) has studied
moving average strategies on TSE 300 data from 1977 to 1995. Here,
the same sample is employed for a number of analyses of what will
be referred to as the insample. Eight more years of data, 1996 to
2003, were collected and used as an out-of-sample period for comparison
purposes. The predictive power of the strategies was evaluated by
testing the trading signals for randomness because non-random signals
have the potential to be exploited for excess returns. The economic
performance of the strategies was then studied by comparing both
simple returns and total returns, adjusted for risk and transaction
costs, with the return on a buy-and-hold position. Finally, a Consistency
Check of the strategies was performed to see whether they maintained
their performance ranking over time. Did the best remain the best
and the worst the worst?
The analysis reveals that the strategies generate nonrandom signals.
Despite the large qualitative differences between sample periods,
the average holding period of a position and the proportion of long
to short positions remain constant. All of the strategies yield
excess returns over buy-and-hold, and none of them is riskier than
the passive approach. The best performing models have negative betas.
The results are largely consistent over various comparison criteria,
and are robust to twoway transaction costs of 25 basis points. A
rank order test of the models’ risk-adjusted performance points
to a degree of forecast reliability. There is also a positive and
significant relationship between conditional returns and unconditional
variance, which implies higher profits in more volatile periods.5
Previous Research
Brock, Lakonishok and LeBaron (1992) apply two of the most popular
ad-hoc trading models, the moving average and the trading range
breakout, to Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) index daily data
from 1897 to 1986. Their findings are noteworthy because every one
of the models yields significant excess returns over the simple
buy-and-hold strategy. The authors employed a bootstrap technique
to deal with the nonnormality of equity return distributions, comparing
actual trading strategy returns to returns simulated from a number
of generating processes, and found that actual returns are not consistent
with a random walk, autoregressive, GARCH-M, or E-GARCH processes.
Buy signals consistently produce higher returns than sell signals,
and returns following buy signals are less volatile than those following
sells. This asymmetry has been studied by Gencay (1998), who documents
a non-linear predictability of stock market returns whereas moving
averages experience at least a 10% forecast improvement in more
volatile years
Although Brock, Lakonishok and LeBaron do not find differences
in trading model performance across sub-samples, replications of
their work by others suggest weakening profits in more recent periods.
Sullivan, Timmermann, and White (1999), for instance, document that
the best model from 1897 to 1986 does not repeat its superior performance
in the out-of-sample period 1987 to 1996. In fact, none of the models
is able to maintain its profitability. They offer three possible
explanations: that the out-of-sample period is not representative;
that the trading models themselves are no longer representative;
and that markets have become more efficient. They ultimately favour
the third, citing low-cost computing power, lower transaction costs,
and increased liquidity as possible causes of heightened market
efficiency. Ready (2002) reports similar findings and speculates
that arbitrage activities on Wall Street have minimized trading
models, return opportunities. Employing data from 1962 to 1996 for
NYSE and from 1973 to 1996 for NASDAQ, Kwon and Kish (2002) find
weakening profits from trading models and suggest that markets are
becoming more efficient in disseminating information to a wider
range of investors.
Moving average strategies are, however, economically effective
where trading costs are low. Isakov and Hollistein (1999) find that
investors who face two-way transaction costs of less than 0.66%
can benefit on the Swiss market (SBC Index, 1969-1997) and conclude
that, for a large fraction of participants, the weak form of market
efficiency cannot be rejected. Two separate studies employing large
samples, 1935 to 1994, for the FT30 [Hudson, Dempsey and Keasey
(1996)] and 1926 to 1991 for the DJIA [Bessembinder and Chan (1998)],
estimate identical average break-even two-way transaction costs
of 0.8% and 0.78%, respectively. In contrast, Ito (1999) reports
an average break-even cost of 1.58% for Canada from 1980 to 1996.
The breakeven levels estimated in this study are much lower for
roughly the same period, whereas the differences resulting from
data samples and trading strategies cannot explain the gap. It appears
that Ito did not distinguish between buy-sell differences and actual
returns in the 1999 study, as he does in a later study.
Data and methodology
Since the omission of dividends may lead to overstated excess returns,
the strategies are examined using both simple returns, which are
based solely on daily price changes, and total returns, which are
based on price changes and distributions (stocks, dividends, etc.).
The sample consists of three daily time series: the S&P/TSX
Composite Price Index, the S&P/TSX Composite Total Return Index,
and the average yield on 91-day Government of Canada T-bills, the
risk-free interest rate being used in Sharpe and Jensen risk adjustments.
The sample runs from the first trading day of 1977, January 3rd,
to the last trading day of 2003, December 31st, for a total of 6,803
observations. The first 200 trading days are set aside for calculation
of the first observation of the moving averages. To test for consistency,
the sample was split into two sub-samples: an in-sample, January
3rd, 1977 to December 29th, 1995, which is the same as Ito’s,
and an out-of-sample, January 2nd, 1996 to December 31st, 2003.
All data were obtained from the Toronto Stock Exchange—Canadian
Financial Markets Research Centre Summary Information Database (TSX-CFMRC),
a product of the TSX Group.
Returns were calculated as differences of the natural logarithms
of closing prices, and annual returns, where used, were estimated
using continuous compounding for an average of 252 trading days.
Long, short and out-of-market positions are initiated following
buy, sell and neutral signals, respectively. A long position yields
a return equal to the buy-and-hold; a short position yields a return
equal to the negative of the buy-andhold return; and an out-of-market
position yields the risk-free rate. The cost of borrowing to sell
short was implemented conservatively: it included the dividend yield
and the risk-free rate. This method is the least biased when compared
to other approaches, such as replacing short positions with out-of-market
positions [Ready (2002)], which assumes equality between negative
risk premia and the risk-free rate, or a double-or-out strategy
[Bessembinder and Chan (1998)], which assumes equality between long
and short position returns.
Recognizing the non-normality of equity returns, a set of distribution-free
tests, the Chi-square, Mood’s median and Wilcoxon’s
rank-sum test, were used to test hypotheses about the randomness
of buy and sell signals. The premise is that the process of generating
buy and sell signal return series is equivalent to a sampling procedure
with the MA (p, q, r) model as the sample selection method and the
buy-and-hold return series as the underlying population. As long
as the selection method is random, buy and sell sampling distributions
should approximate the population distribution; otherwise, the model
possesses some predictive power. The economic performance was then
examined by adjusting the moving average returns for risk and transaction
costs. The notion of risk-adjusted returns is fundamental for the
precise evaluation of trading strategies, because it demands comparison
of returns at equal levels of risk. This study implemented it using
the standard Sharpe ratio (1966) and Jensen measure (1968).
Subtracting 25 basis points for every two-way transaction accounts
for the trading costs presumably borne by institutional investors.
Oneway transaction costs were applied only for trading models with
filter bands when there was a shift from a neutral to a long or
short position or vice versa. Transaction costs were subtracted
from the conditional returns on the day they were incurred. The
analysis also includes an estimation of the break-even two-way transaction
cost across all trading models. Finally, I asked whether there is
a significant difference across moving average strategies and, most
importantly, whether there is a degree of forecasting reliability.
To do this, the trading models were first ranked according to their
Sharpe ratios. Then a median exact test for differences across k
independent samples of the returns was performed. To estimate the
exact significance with 99% confidence, a Monte Carlo simulation
was conducted on 10,000 sample “tables.”Whenever the
hypothesis that the trading models are not equally effective was
rejected, the best and the worst strategies were excluded, and the
procedure was repeated on the remaining models until all were tested.
I refer to this as the Consistency Check.
Empirical Results
A description of the trading signals is presented in Table 1. The
columns Long and Short contain the number of days long and short
positions were held relative to the sample’s duration; Trade
corresponds to the trading frequency, and it is given as the average
holding period of a position in number of days. Moving average strategies
result in a long position being held roughly two-thirds of the time
and a short position for the remaining third with remarkable consistency
between samples. Moreover, the holding periods are similar, in-sample
and out-ofsample. These are striking findings considering how different
market conditions were: from 1977 to 1995 daily price and total
price returns were 0.0341% and 0.0484%, with a standard deviation
of approximately 0.77%, and one-day serial correlation of 23.5%;
from 1996 to 2003 those readings were 0.0276%, 0.0342%, 1.07%, and
8.6%, respectively. There is a strong positive relationship between
the length of the averaging period and the trading frequency, or
the length of time a position was held. A 50-day moving average,
for example, resulted in a position being held for three weeks,
whereas a 200-day strategy meant a position was held for two months.
The effect of the filter bands was to increase the time out of the
market to about 10% without a change in the relative duration of
the long and short positions.
The distribution-free tests for the randomness of buy and sell
signals reveal significant differences between the moving average
and buy-and-hold distributions, implying some predictive power to
the former. This predictive power is partly reflected in the observation
that average returns following sell signals are all significantly
positive, and this result is largely consistent with Brock, Lakonishok
and LeBaron (1992) and Mills (1997), among others. A few of the
tests of the two double crossover strategies, however, fail to reject
the null hypotheses from 1996 to 2003 (see Table 1, models not marked
with S in the first column). Interestingly, these are the models
that have the lowest signal-generating frequency and thus the longest
holding periods. Clearly these properties affect their conditional
return distributions in a way that brings them closer to the buy-and-hold
strategy.
The
returns associated with the moving average strategies are less risky.
Long positions are less volatile than short positions, and overall,
none of the trading models is riskier than buy-and-hold, in- or
out-of-sample. Table 2 highlights the risk properties of moving
average strategies using the Sharpe ratio as well as Jensen’s
Alpha as a performance measure and Beta as the risk parameter. Alpha,
as it is used here, is the average incremental risk-adjusted return
due to the predictive power of the trading models, where positive
and significant intercepts are indicative of superior performance;
the beta is a measure of tendency of conditional returns to move
in line with the market risk premia.
All of the moving average strategies outperform buy-and-hold under
the Sharpe criterion with average ratios of 1.897% and 3.1029% for
the two periods as compared to –0.4134% and 1.1309% for the
passive approach. Nine in-sample and all ten out-of-sample alphas
are positive, but for only two models, MA (1, 50, 0) and MA (1,
50, 0.01), are they highly significant (see Table 2, models marked
with S in the first column). Moving average models outperformed
the buy and-hold strategy by an average of 0.0106% or 2.71% annually,
and from 1996 to 2003, by 0.0328% or 8.62%. It is worth pointing
out that the two models with the highest alphas have significantly
negative betas. This is typical of strategies designed to counter
the market, such as those employed by hedge funds. Lastly, while
buy-and-hold returns are higher when based on total return series,
moving average returns are still superior.
Table
3 summarizes the returns adjusted for transaction costs. Columns
ER and ER25 present the annualized continuously compounded excess
price return differences between moving average strategy and buy-and-hold
returns before and after two-way transaction costs of 25 basis points,
respectively. Column B/E shows the break-even or two-way transaction
cost measured in basis points at which a trading model and buy-and-hold
average returns are equal. Before transaction costs, all strategies
yield higher mean daily returns than buy-and-hold, in-sample and
out-of-sample. MA (1, 50, 0.01) generates the highest return of
0.0686% or 18.87% at an annual rate. This is 9.9% greater than buy-and-hold
return. Overall, it appears that trading models with lower smoothing
parameters tend to yield higher returns, and that the introduction
of trading filter bands improves performance in every case. These
findings are valid when total price returns are employed.
After adjusting returns with two-way transaction costs of 25 basis
points, only the MA (5, 150, 0) model is unable to outperform the
buy-and-hold in the first period. The other trading strategies require
an average two way transaction cost of less than 50 basis points
in order to be profitable. Interestingly, despite its high trading
frequency, the best performing model is again MA (1, 50, 0.01);
it yields approximately 6.47% excess return per year and is profitable
up to trading costs of 74 basis points. Accounting for dividend
yields, the average break even for a single crossover moving average
model is 23 basis points. From 1996 to 2003 the break-even levels
increase to 89 basis points for a two-way transaction, which suggests
higher profits. This is attributable to the higher market volatility
and its relationship to conditional returns. Overall, the break-even
costs are strikingly similar to those reported on DJIA, FT30 and
SBC.
One
gauge of forecast reliability is to see whether the best and worst
performing trading models in the in-sample keep their ranks in the
out-of-sample. Assume that moving average strategies are not significantly
different one from another. Hence, the probability of a trading
model changing rank from best to worst or vice versa in a later
period is equal across all models, and so combining them and using
a weighted signal would be as good as any. If, on the other hand,
trading models differ significantly in performance, then an optimal
strategy will involve separating the best from the worst. That,
in essence, is the Consistency Check, as described previously and
presented here in Table 4. The column Sharpe Ranking shows the trading
models ranked according to their Sharpe ratios, where 1-10 includes
all models, 2-9 excludes the best and the worst after the first
simulation, etc.; columns Lower B and Upper B are the lower and
upper band of the 99% confidence interval calculated with Monte
Carlo simulations based on 10,000 sample tables of the corresponding
p-value. Best Model and Worst Model show the strategies that yield
the highest and the lowest mean returns within those groups.
For 1977 to 1995, the null hypothesis of equality among moving
average strategies is rejected at 1% level of significance as long
as the two best and the two worst performing models are present.
There is virtually no significant difference among trading models
ranked from three to eight. The results for the second period are
similar. Most important is that the two best performing, MA (1,
50, 0,01) and MA (1, 50, 0), and two worst performing, MA (5, 150,
0,01) and MA (5, 150, 0) strategies are the same, in-sample and
out-of-sample (see Table 4, models marked with “*” in
the last two columns).
Conclusion
Moving average strategies demonstrate striking efficiency and remarkable
consistency in two completely different samples of Canadian equity
market data. This is not attributable to chance, as the various
comparison criteria used here provide strong support for a degree
of forecasting reliability. Moreover, these strategies yield returns
very similar to those obtained using DJIA, FT30 and SBC data, which
implies broader effectiveness. The findings in this paper suggest
avenues for future practitioner research. Moving averages can be
easily incorporated in various equity pricing models, cloned in
zero cost portfolios by matching buy and sell signals for different
stocks, or simply tested with lower smoothing parameters that promise
higher profits.
Acknowledgments
The author is grateful to Professor Gregory Lypny,
Ph.D., for his guidance and support.
Endnotes
1. Indices may contain stale information or exclude
dividend distributions, leading to overstated predictive power of
tested strategies.
2. Allen and Karjalainen (1999) conclude that with 0.25% transaction
costs most of the genetically generated rules “are effectively
similar to a 250-day moving average rule,” page 262.
3. Three ad-hoc trading-range-breakout strategies have been studied
as well. Results are given in the full version of the paper, which
is available upon request.
4. Sullivan, Timmermann and White (1999) provide evidence that the
selected models are robust to data snooping using a test that accounts
for the bias inherent in a researcher’s choice of trading
models to apply.
5. To my knowledge, the full version of this paper is the first
to document and study this relationship.
References
Allen, F., and R. Karjalainen, 1999, “Using
Genetic Algorithms to Find Technical Trading Models,” Journal
of Financial Economics 51, 245-271.
Bessembinder, H., and K. Chan, 1998, “Market efficiency and
the returns to technical analysis,” Financial Management
27, 5-17.
Brock, W., J. Lakonishok, and B. LeBaron, 1992, “Simple Technical
Trading Models and the Stochastic Properties of Stock Returns,”
Journal of Finance 47, 1731-1764.
Gencay, R., 1998, “The predictability of security returns
with simple technical trading models,” Journal of Empirical
Finance 5, 347-359.
Hudson, R., M. Dempsey, and K. Keasey, 1996, “A note on the
weak form efficiency of capital markets: The application of simple
technical trading models to UK stock prices—1935 to 1994,”
Journal of Banking & Finance 20, 1121-1132.
Isakov, D., and M. Hollistein, 1999, “Application of simple
technical trading models to Swiss stock prices. Is it profitable?,”
Finanzmarkt und Portfolio Management 13, 9-26.
Ito, A., 1999, “Profits on technical trading models and time-varying
expected returns: Evidence from Pacific-Basin equity markets,”
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 7, 283-330.
Ito, A., 2003, “Technical Trading Models and Nonlinear Time
Series Models,” Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies.
Jensen, M., 1968, “Problems in Selection of Security Portfolios:
The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964,”
Journal of Finance 23, 398-416.
Kwon, K., and R. Kish, 2002, “A comparative study of technical
trading strategies and return predictability: an extension of Brock,
Lakonishok, and LeBaron (1992) using NYSE and NASDAQ indices,”
The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 42, 611-631.
Mills, T., 1997, “Technical Analysis and the London Stock
Exchange: Testing Trading Models Using the FT30,” International
Journal of Financial Economics 2, 319-331.
Ready, M., 2002, “Profits from technical trading models,”
Financial Management 31, 43-61.
Sharpe, W., 1966, “Mutual Fund Performance,” Journal
of Business 39, 119-138.
Sullivan, R., A. Timmermann, and H. White, 1999, “Data-Snooping,
Technical Trading Model Performance and the Bootstrap,” The
Journal of Finance 54, 1647-1691.
—Matey Gerov, M.Sc., MSTA, graduated from the John Molson
School of Business in 2005
For a PDF version of this article, click
here.
|
|