| Field
Notes |
| IPOs: The Short and Long of What We Know |
| by Stephen Foerster |
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One of the most important events in the life of a firm, and one
of particular interest to institutional investors, is the transition
from being a private company to a public one through the initial
public offering (IPO) process. The IPO provides a fresh source of
capital that is critical to the growth of the firm and provides
the founder and other shareholders such as venture capitalists a
liquid market for their shares. From an institutional investor's
perspective, the IPO provides an opportunity to share in the rewards
of the growth of the firm.
Given the importance of IPOs to pension funds and mutual funds,
it is not surprising that much research has been devoted to the
topic. We have made great strides in understanding the impact of
IPOs, but many unanswered questions remain. I summarize what we
know about IPOs, primarily from an investor's perspective, and I
share some preliminary results of some research I am currently undertaking.
I focus on research in the areas of short-run returns, hot and cold
markets, long-run returns, global IPOs and withdrawn IPOs.
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| INITIAL RETURNS |
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If you are fortunate enough to get in on the ground floor of an
IPO, short-run returns are often quite impressive. According to
data compiled by Jay Ritter of University of Florida, over the last
40 years U.S. IPOs have enjoyed first-day returns of over 18%, while
over the past 30 years Canadian IPOs have experienced initial returns
of a more modest 6%. This phenomenon is also known as short-run
underpricing, as the company appears to be "leaving money on
the table."
There are a number of possible explanations for this short-run
IPO phenomenon. One explanation is the rationing of a limited number
of shares available in an IPO. Since the number of shares subscribed
often far exceeds the number of shares available, many investors
face a potential "winner's curse" because they are only
able to obtain a sufficient number of shares in less desirable IPOs.
Thus these investors need to be enticed to buy new shares and the
enticement takes the form of an initially low price. A second explanation
is that underpricing can occur in order to create a "cascade"
effect whereby initial investors are enticed to buy in, in the hope
that more investors will follow. A third explanation is that firms
wish to "leave a good taste" with investors since the
firms may be planning to raise further capital in the future and
hope to do so at more favourable prices. The bottom line for investors
is: expect the best in the early days.
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| HOT AND COLD MARKETS |
| IPO markets alternate between hot and cold in terms
of both initial returns as well as numbers of IPOs coming to the market.
For example, according to data provided by Securities Data Corporation,
after the October 1987 major market correction, the number of new
U.S. IPOs in each year from 1988 to 1990 fell to about one-third of
the 1987 level. The number of IPOs peaked in 1996, but the pace cooled
dramatically during 2001 after the technology bubble burst. Average
initial-day returns in 1987, 1988, and 1994 were below 10%, but climbed
well over 50% in 1999 and 2000. More recent initial-day returns are
much more in line with long-run averages. As experienced in 1999 and
2000, these hot markets are often concentrated in a small number of
industries. For investors in hot markets, an IPO concentration can
leave one vulnerable to any sudden sector downturns due to lack of
diversification. |
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| LONG-RUN RETURNS |
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While the short-run performance of IPOs is often quite impressive,
the long-run performance over the subsequent three to five years
is not as impressive. Excluding the initial-day return, IPOs tend
to underperform various benchmarks. According to Ritter, for U.S.
IPOs that came to market between 1970 and 1998, the IPOs tended
to underperform a sample of similar-sized firms by about 4% per
year over the first three years (10.4% per year versus 14.2%), and
by about 2% over the first five years (12.1% per year versus 14.0%).
One always has to be careful in an IPO context interpreting these
averages, since it is often the case that a small number of IPOs
do spectacularly well while the majority are mediocre (in other
words, these reported means are often much greater than the medians).
Researchers have suggested some possible explanations for these
long-run IPO results. According to one explanation, the type of
investors who buy in to IPOs tend to be the most optimistic. With
an IPO, there is often great uncertainty about the long-term prospects
of the firm. Over time, the uncertainty is resolved and the divergence
of opinion between optimistic and pessimistic investors narrows,
resulting in a relatively lower price. According to another explanation,
investment dealers often act as impresarios, promoting and talking
up IPOs in order to create the appearance of considerable demand
for the stock. Thus many stocks that experience particularly large
initial returns are often the same stocks that experience very poor
long-run performance. According to a third explanation, the initial
private owners attempt to take advantage of a window of opportunity
when markets appear to be most receptive to IPOs and often issue
at a time when market valuation metrics (e.g., price-earnings multiples)
are above-average. Thus for investors, long-term performance is
often disappointing.
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| GLOBAL CAPITAL RAISING |
| While many studies have focused on IPOs in a domestic
setting, Andrew Karolyi and I have investigated the growing phenomenon
of non-U.S. firms raising capital in the attractive and receptive
U.S. market. In a recent publication, "The Long-Run Performance
of Global Equity Offerings," we investigated firms in 35 countries
that issued equity (both IPOs and seasoned equity offerings) between
1982 and 1996, through the American Depositary Receipt (ADR) mechanism.
We found that these global equity-offering firms underperformed various
benchmarks by between 8% and 15% after three years, but there was
considerable cross-section variability in our results. In particular,
firms from countries with significant investment barriers for foreigners
tended to outperform their benchmarks after controlling for other
factors. In addition, non-U.S. firms that were able to capture a greater
share of U.S. trading volume performed better. Thus, interpreting
the performance of IPOs in a global setting is much more complex but
there may be opportunities as well. |
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| WITHDRAWN IPOS |
| In some currently unpublished work with my Ivey
School of Business colleague, Craig Dunbar, we investigate the phenomenon
of planned IPOs that are withdrawn from the market, an area of research
that has not attracted considerable attention, but one that is growing
in importance. Between 1987 and 2000, almost one-quarter of planned
IPOs were withdrawn. In 2000, the level of withdrawn IPOs was over
40%. Many of these planned IPOs withdrew due to adverse market conditions,
often with the expectation of returning during better times. However,
our research shows that well below 10% of these firms make a subsequent
successful return to the market. We further investigate the performance
of these returning IPOs and find that while their initial one-day
performance is slightly below that of relevant benchmarks, their performance
over the subsequent year is much stronger. Thus these "second
time lucky" IPOs may be worth watching, and may be worth the
wait for patient investors. |
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| Stephen Foerster is the Louis Lagasse Family
Faculty Fellow at the Richard Ivey School of Business, The University
of Western Ontario. |
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