|
Canada's top six pension investment agencies already manage a collective
$300 billion today, mainly assets of large public sector pension
plans in Ontario, Quebec, Alberta, and British Columbia. A seventh,
the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB), has begun to drive
that number towards $400 billion. The fledgling federal Public Sector
Pension Investment Board will become the eighth Canadian public
sector pension fund giant within a decade, sending the combined
pension pot towards $500 billion.
By almost any standard, this massive accumulation of public pension
fund assets, managed by only a handful of agencies, represents a
significant concentration of economic power in this country. As
just one benchmark, the float-weighted value of the Toronto Stock
Exchange 300 (TSE300) stock index is about $1 trillion today. The
implication is that just eight investment agencies could lock up
effective control of all of corporate Canada over the next decade
if they chose to do so. Thus, if used for the wrong purposes, these
eight agencies could willfully distort business decision-making
in Canada, and seriously damage its economic prospects for decades
to come.
In his National Post editorial, Terry Corcoran suggests that it
is in fact likely to happen. And of course, he is not alone. He
represents a sizable constituency in Canada deeply suspicious of
any concentration of economic power, especially when it resides
in just a handful of quasi-government agencies.
The purpose of this article is to tell the other (far brighter!)
side of the story. If used for the right purposes, the eight mega
pension funds will not only serve their own stakeholders well, but
also help sharpen business decision-making in Canada, and brighten
its economic prospects for years to come. In short, the handful
of Canadian mega-pension funds can be important forces of societal
'good' rather than evil.
Below we set out the necessary conditions to achieve this outcome,
and what must be done to put those necessary conditions in place.
We start with some basic economic principles and see where they
take us.
Of Principals and Agents
Over 200 years ago, Adam Smith showed that competitive markets,
enforceable property rights, and 'enlightened self-interest' were
all critical elements in making democratic capitalism work. While
Smith's core ideas have withstood the test of time, they have required
continuous adaptation in their application in an in-creasingly complex
world.
A more complex world requires more complex organizations to do
its work. This is true for for-profit corporations, for institutions
in education, health, religion, and other typically not-for-profit
fields, for government agencies, for labour unions, and yes, for
pension funds too. We have become a society dominated by special
purpose organizations.
All of these special purpose organizations have one thing in common.
The 'owners' of the organization and the 'managers' of the organization
are no longer the same people. In other words, in a complex world,
there is typically a separation between the 'principals' and their
'agents'. Which means we need to revisit Adam Smith's concept of
'enlightened self-interest'. Now we need to ask: whose self-interest
are we talking about?
The principals' or the agents'?
Clearly, if the respective interests of these two groups are different,
the organization is in trouble. As it is the agents who show up
for work every day and not the principals, the agents will call
the tune. And it doesn't matter whether the organization is a for-profit
business, a government agency, or a pension fund. As soon as there
is a separation of ownership and control, you have the potential
for the agents to carry out their own agendas (economists call this
'rent seeking'), rather than the agenda of the principals.
Remedy: Good Governance
'Rent seeking' by agents at the expense of principals is not just
some abstract economic concept. It actually happens every day of
the week. Politicians seek favours for their friends and constituents
at the expense of the electorate as a whole. Labour union leaders
use member dues to further their own political ends. Business managers
use shareholder funds for reasons other than maximizing shareholder
value. And yes, pension fund managers too make decisions difficult
to square with the ultimate best interests of the fund's stakeholders.
Let's be clear. We're discussing something far more subtle here
than clearly unlawful behaviour. Wouldn't that fountain look nice
on the St. Maurice river as it flows through Shawinigan? Doesn't
it create jobs in a high unemployment area? Doesn't the NDP represent
workers' interests? Why shouldn't part of union dues support a political
party? What's wrong with revaluing senior management's underwater
stock options? Won't it give them incentive to try harder? And why
shouldn't we attend those educational seminars in Florida in the
winter paid for by service providers?
It's for the good of the pension fund,
isn't it?
How can principals protect themselves against this kind of 'rent
seeking' behaviour? Complex societies need effective mechanisms
that align the economic interests of the principals and agents of
its many for-profit and not-for-profit organizations. These governance
mechanisms may go by names such as 'parliament', 'board of directors',
'board of trustees', 'pension committee', etc., depending on the
particular context.
Good governance requires a clear understanding of the interests
of the organization's principals, and ensuring that the organization's
agents can, and are motivated to further those interests.1
Will Pension Fund Governance Fail?
This 'good governance' rule applies to all of Canada's for-profit
and not-for-profit organizations. The more powerful the organization,
the greater the positive impact of good governance on the welfare
of the organization's principals. For example, the federal government
is probably still Canada's most powerful single organization in
terms of its potential impact (for good or evil) on the economic
welfare of 30 million Canadians. How good is its governance? Are
there processes to evaluate it and make it better? The provincial
governments and Canada's major corporations are also powerful organizations.
Do they have effective governance mechanisms? Are there processes
to evaluate them and make them better?
And yes, then there are those eight powerful Canadian pension fund
agencies with assets likely to approach $500 billion before the
end of the decade. How good is their governance? Do they have processes
to evaluate it and make it better?
Make no mistake, these are the questions Terry Corcoran and like-minded
folks are implicitly passing judgment on when they decry 'Bay Street
Socialism'. They are predicting that the governance mechanisms of
Canada's mega public sector pension funds will fail, and that the
result will be 'rent seeking' by mega fund managers and their political
masters on a grand scale. Are they right?
Betting the Other Way
If Mr. Corcoran would be willing to put some money on his prediction,
we would happily take the other side of the bet. In fairness, here
are some things he should know before deciding to proceed with the
bet:
Through legislation, Canadian pension funds are explicitly required
to act only in the best financial interests of their stakeholders.
In other words, 'rent seeking' is explicitly forbidden by law. The
only court case ever brought forward under this legislation involved
'rent seeking' by the fiduciaries of a corporate pension fund (i.e.,
the Enfield Case). There has never been a case against a public
sector fund.
Good governance has become a high priority agenda item at all of
Canada's eight public sector mega funds. The newer funds have adopted
current best practices right out of the starting gate. The older
funds have given their governance structures a major overhaul. In
all cases, this has led to increased clarity about who the fund's
principals really are, and how their financial interests are best
furthered. It has also led to increased clarity about the respective
responsibilities of the board and senior management, and how to
measure and report organizational performance.
The quest for good governance has been spurred by recent research
suggesting it may be worth as much as 50-100 basis points per annum
in terms of extra return.2 This is in addition to the natural 20-40
basis point cost advantage mega funds already have due to their
large scale.3 The combination of good governance and low unit costs
makes the eight mega funds very competitive investment agencies
compared to, for example, Canada's mutual funds.
A direct outcome of these developments has been to make pension
fund board membership a more attractive proposition for people with
the right qualifications. In other words, there is a board 'professionalization'
movement under way.4 This movement recognizes that the ideal board
possesses a number of complementary skill/experience sets as well
as a sense of collegiality and a strong chair.
A further element of improved governance is greater public transparency
in what each of the mega funds is trying to achieve, and how it
is going about it. The fund boards and managements increasingly
recognize that they do not operate in a vacuum. Public accountability
is paramount to their ongoing viability as effective financial institutions.
Such transparency also provides an ongoing impetus to continuously
improve governance practices.
These developments will produce high good governance rankings for
the eight Canadian mega pension funds relative to other major Canadian
organizations (whether for-profit or not) in the coming decades.
As a result, there will be little scope for 'rent seeking'.
How Mega Funds Do Good
If we are right, Canada's mega funds are well positioned to promote
the financial interests of their principals in the coming decades.
That is not the only good news. By doing so, they will be furthering
the financial interests of Canadians at large as well. They will
do so as both knowledgeable transactors, and informed holders of
government and corporate securities.
As knowledgeable transactors, they will be a stabilizing influence
in frothy financial markets driven by short-term investors (whether
retail or institutional) whose main focus is price momentum. Against
these kinds of transactors, superior fundamental information and
disciplined buy and sell strategies will win the day over the longer
term. Canadian financial markets benefit through lower volatility
and securities prices that eventually reflect fundamental value.5
Knowledgeable transactors will also be proactive in ensuring financial
markets are operationally efficient. An important focus for them
will be the further development of electronic trading mechanisms
where they can execute transactions anonymously at low cost. They
will not tolerate paying rents to intermediaries without receiving
value in return.
As informed holders, the managers of Canada's mega funds will not
take kindly to any 'rent seeking' behaviour by the managers of the
organizations whose securities they hold. A good example is the
generous flow of stock options heading towards the senior officers
of many publicly traded corporations today.
Are the boards of these corporations doing their jobs representing
the financial interests of the principals (i.e., the shareholders)?
In other words, are they ensuring that stock option-related compensation
is reasonable, and consistent with shareholder wealth maximization?
Only Canada's mega funds have the clout and the independence to
pose these awkward questions, and hold the boards of publicly traded
corporations accountable for good governance on their behalf.
Mega Funds and 'Rent Seeking'
We have already noted that politicians are potential 'rent seekers'
too. They will only attempt to meddle in the mega funds' affairs
if they calculate that the political gains from doing so will outweigh
the political costs. We find it difficult to imagine such circumstances.
Indeed two recent events suggest that the tide is going the other
way:
The Foreign Property Rule for pension funds and RRSPs has been
a (albeit clumsy) form of political 'rent seeking'. The political
logic has been that because of the favourable tax treatment afforded
pension plans, the beneficiaries 'owed' it to Canadian taxpayers
to invest most of these funds in Canada. Originally the Rule said
90% of assets. In 1990 it was relaxed to 80%. In the last Budget
it was further reduced to 70%. The political calculus is suggesting
there are no votes to be gained in holding Canadian pension funds
captive to fuzzy nationalistic objectives. Canadians do not take
kindly to politicians meddling with their retirement funds.
The only Canadian pension fund investment agency that does have
some ambiguity regarding its investment objectives is the Caisse
de dépôt et placement du Québec. Its charter
makes reference to furthering the economic development of Québec.
We find it noteworthy that Caisse's senior management team has undertaken
a recent publicity campaign to assure all who will listen that their
sole objective is to earn the highest possible return for the Caisse's
clients. To date, no Québec politician has dared to challenge
this message.
In short, political 'rent seeking' with the pension reserves of
Canadians has become a vote-losing proposition. That is the fundamental
point Mr. Corcoran and his intellectual soulmates seem to be missing.
The 'Invisible Hand' Lives!
Thus, all considered, Canadian public pension fund power is far
likelier to be a force for good, and not evil. Adam Smith's 'invisible
hand' can continue to wave its magic wand, as long as it is guided
by good governance processes.
Endnotes
1. In a pension plan context, 'principals' are people who
have a direct financial interest in the 'pension deal'. In a defined
benefit plan, these are usually both plan members and the plan sponsor
(which in turn is usually back stopped by either taxpayers in public
sector plans, and shareholders in corporate plans). An important
duty of a pension plan's governors is to clearly understand who
the plan's principals are, and what the true nature of their financial
interests in the pension plan balance sheet is. Financial interests
can only be aligned if they are first understood.
2. For detail, see "Improving Pension Fund Performance",
Keith Ambachtsheer, Ronald Capelle, Tom Scheibelhut, Financial Analysts
Journal, Nov.-Dec. 1998.
3. For detail, see "The Economics of Pension Fund
Management", Keith Ambachtsheer, Financial Analysts Journal,
Nov.-Dec. 1994.
4. For detail, see "Pension Fund Excellence; Creating
Value for Stakeholders", Keith Ambachtsheer, Don Ezra, John
Wiley & Sons, New York, 1998.
5. The assumption here is that the predominant active management
strategies employed by the CPPIB, and other large Canadian public
funds over time will be value-oriented rather than momentum-oriented.
Such strategies are stabilizing in the sense that they tend to be
net buyers of good companies which are undervalued (i.e., currently
out-of-favour stocks other investors are avoiding), and net sellers
of overvalued stocks (i.e., currently in-favour stocks being chased
by pure momentum investors).
Keith Ambachtsheer is president of K.P.A. Advisory Services
Ltd. in Toronto.
|